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All in the Family: Examining Louisiana’s Faulty
Birth Order-Based Discrimination
INTRODUCTION
Parents should not have favorite children.1 However, the
Louisiana Legislature forces parents to play favorites when a
parent owes child support to multiple families.2 In multiple family
situations, the obligor3 owes one child support order to the “first
family” and another child support order to the “second family,”
and, if applicable, to other subsequent families.4 Regrettably,
Louisiana has chosen the worst available method to calculate child
support for multiple families.
Although every child is entitled to support from his or her
parents,5 children from prior families receive more financial
support than do children from subsequent families under
Louisiana’s current system for calculating child support.6 This
Copyright 2012, by TAYLOR GAY.
1. See Joshua D. Foster & Ilan Shrira, When Parents Play Favorites:
Preferring One Child over Another, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Jan. 10, 2009),
available at http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-narcissus-in-all-us/200
901/when-parents-play-favorites (“Disfavored children experience worse
outcomes across the board: more depression, greater aggressiveness, lower selfesteem, and poorer academic performance . . . And it’s not all rosy for the favored
children eithertheir siblings often come to resent them, poisoning those
relationships.”).
2. The term multiple family describes cases in which an obligor has
children from different partners who have existing child support orders and none
of those dependents live in the obligor’s household. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:315.1(C)(3) (Supp. 2012). Generally, the meaning of multiple family is
different from the meaning of second family. See id. § 9:315(C)(2). Second
family situations typically involve “the legal obligation of a party to support
dependents who are not the subject of the action before the court and who are in
the party’s household.” Id. For purposes of this Comment, however, the term
second family refers to the second family to which an obligor owes child
support.
3. For purposes of this Comment, the parent who has a court order
requiring him or her to pay child support is deemed the obligor or nondomiciliary parent, while the other parent, who does not have a court order
requiring him or her to pay child support, is deemed the domiciliary parent.
4. This Comment refers to the obligor’s first and preceding families as the
prior family and the obligor’s second and sequential families as the subsequent
family.
5. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.1(A) (Supp. 2012) (“The premise of
these guidelines as well as the provisions of the Civil Code is that child support
is a continuous obligation of both parents, children are entitled to share in the
current income of both parents, and children should not be the economic victims
of divorce or out-of-wedlock birth.”).
6. See discussion infra Part I.B.
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statutory preference is known as a “first-family-first” policy.7 The
Louisiana Legislature’s intent behind using this policy to calculate
multiple family support orders is to deter divorce and ensure that
the first family receives the amount of support it would have
received if the family were still together.8 Yet, despite these goals,
Louisiana’s child support guidelines9 unconstitutionally
discriminate10 against subsequently born children.11 Additionally,
child support awards rendered under the guidelines create feelings
of inferiority in subsequent children12 and do not serve the best
interest of all the obligor’s children.13
The goal of this Comment is to highlight the major problems
with the first-family-first policy14 and to identify potential
alternatives that would better calculate support in multiple family

7. See LAURA W. MORGAN, CHILD SUPPORT
AND APPLICATION § 3.04[b] (Supp. 2004).

GUIDELINES: INTERPRETATION

8. See Katherine Shaw Spaht, The Two “ICS” of the 2001 Louisiana Child
Support Guidelines: Economics and Politics, 62 LA. L. REV. 709, 732–33 (2002)
(The statutory rhetoric that is now incorporated into the guidelines is “that [1] a
child should not be the victim of divorce and [2] the obligor [cannot] ‘shed’ or,
at a minimum, reduce his responsibility to his first family by incurring
additional obligations to a second family.”).
9. The current Louisiana child support guidelines, which implement the
first-family-first policy, are hereinafter referred to as the “guidelines.” See LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315–:315.47 (2008 & Supp. 2012).
10. The guidelines classify the obligor’s children based on the family to
which they were born and discriminate against children born in the obligor’s
second family. The determining factor for which family is awarded more child
support money is based on who establishes the child support order first. This has
been described as a “race to the court house.” REVIEW OF LOUISIANA’S CHILD
SUPPORT GUIDELINES: 2000 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CHILD
SUPPORT GUIDELINES REVIEW PURSUANT TO LSA RS 9:315.12 31 (2000)
[hereinafter 2000 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS]. Children from the first
family, however, have a significant leg-up in this race because they have more
time to obtain the child support order than those children from subsequent
families. The guidelines necessarily give a preference to children from the first
family, and for purposes of this Comment, the determining factor for which
family is awarded more support is based on each child’s birth orderi.e., based
on which family the child was born into.
11. See discussion infra Part II.
12. See discussion infra Part III.C.3.
13. See discussion infra Part III.C.1.
14. For an explanation of first family first’s constitutional problems, see
discussion infra Part II. For an explanation of first family first’s policy problems
(which include: the unconstitutionality of first family first, the fact that child
support awards rendered under the guidelines are not in the best interest of all
the obligor’s children, and the fact that child support awards rendered under the
guidelines provoke feelings of inferiority among subsequent children), see
discussion infra Part III.
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cases.15 Part I of this Comment describes how the current
guidelines are applied to multiple family cases and illustrates the
discriminatory treatment of subsequent children resulting from the
first-family-first policy. Next, Part II examines the
unconstitutionality16 of this discriminatory policy17 through the
lens of illegitimacy-based classifications.18 These classifications
are extremely similar and should thus be subject to the same level
of judicial scrutiny.19 Finally, Part III describes the inequities
resulting from the first-family-first policy and discusses alternative
policies that could be implemented to calculate support for
multiple families more fairly.20 Unless and until the guidelines are
amended, Louisiana will continue to violate the Constitution and
deprive subsequent children of the support that they deserve.
I. LOUISIANA’S DISCRIMINATORY METHOD FOR CALCULATING
MULTIPLE FAMILY SUPPORT ORDERS
Ever since the Digest of 1808, Louisiana parents have been
obligated to support their children.21 Although this obligation is

15. See discussion infra Part III.
16. Specifically, the guidelines violate the equal protection clauses found in
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (“No State shall . . .
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.) and article I, section 3 of the Louisiana Constitution
of 1974 (“No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. . . . No law
shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against a person
because of birth . . . .” LA. CONST. art. I, § 3.).
17. See supra note 10.
18. The phrase “illegitimacy-based classifications” refers to past laws that
invidiously discriminated against children based on their parents not being
married at the time of their birth. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 815 (9th ed.
2009) (An illegitimate child is a child born out of lawful wedlock.). The term
illegitimate is no longer an appropriate word for referring to children born out of
wedlock, but this Comment will use the word illegitimate for simplicity’s
sakeas both the jurisprudence evaluated in this Comment and the Louisiana
Civil Code use the term illegitimate to describe children born out of wedlock.
See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 238–245 (2011); discussion infra Part II.
19. Illegitimacy-based classifications are subject to intermediate scrutiny.
Note, Justice Stevens’ Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1146, 1150 (1987).
20. This Comment argues that an equalization policy is the best way to
calculate support for multiple families. See discussion infra Part III.C.5.
21. “Fathers and mothers, by the very act of marrying, contract together the
obligation of nourishing, maintaining and educating their children.” DIGEST OF
1808 ONLINE, bk. 1, tit. 7, art. 46 (1808), http://www.law.lsu.edu/index.cfm?
geaux=digestof1808.home&v=en&t=012&u=018#018. This obligation traces
back further to the Code Napoléon of 1804. “Spouses contract together, by the
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derived from French law,22 Louisiana’s current child support
guidelines have largely been shaped by federal legislation.23 In
1988, Congress passed the Family Support Act,24 which compelled
every state to implement child support guidelines and to choose
one of three child support calculation models.25 In response to the
Act, Louisiana enacted presumptively correct26 child support
guidelines and adopted the “income shares” calculation model.27
A. Income Shares Model
The fundamental principle behind the income shares model is
that a parent’s child support obligation is equal to the portion of
income that parent spent to support the children when the family
was living together.28 The first step in calculating a child support
award under the income shares model is to add the monthly
income of both parents together.29 Then, using the parents’
combined monthly incomes, the judge refers to a table in the
guidelines to determine the basic amount of support owed to the

very act of marrying, the obligation of supporting, maintaining, and educating
their children.” CODE CIVIL DES FRANÇAIS, bk. 1, tit. 10, art. 203 (1804).
22. See id. Louisiana Civil Code article 141 establishes parents’ duty to
support their children. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 141 (2011); see also id. art. 227
(mothers and fathers have obligations to support, to maintain, and to educate
their children); id. art. 240 (parents have a duty to support their children born out
of wedlock).
23. See MORGAN supra note 7, at § 1.02.
24. Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988).
25. MORGAN, supra note 7, at § 1.03 (The Family Support Act did not
prescribe that states choose a specific model for calculating support; instead, the
Act required only that states adopt some model for calculating support.). More
than thirty states implemented the income shares model. See Chapter Nine:
Establishment of Child Support Obligations, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN
SERVICES
(1999)
[hereinafter
Chapter
Nine],
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/css/
essentials_for_attorneys_ch09.pdf. Other states implemented the “Percentage of
Income” model or the “Melson Formula” model. Id.
26. The guidelines create a presumption that the amount resulting from their
application is correct and in the best interest of the child. MORGAN, supra note
7, at § 1.02. See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.1(A) (Supp. 2012);
Christopher L. Blakesley, Louisiana Family Law, 52 LA. L. REV. 607, 610
(1992).
27. Sue Nations, Louisiana's Child Support Guidelines: A Preliminary
Analysis, 50 LA. L. REV. 1057, 1061 (1990). See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 141
cmt. d (2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:315.2(D), 9:315.3–:315.8(A) (2008 &
Supp. 2012).
28. MORGAN, supra note 7, at § 1.03.
29. Id.
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children.30 Next, in order to determine the presumptively correct
amount of support owed,31 the judge adds the child’s daycare costs,
health insurance premium costs, extraordinary medical expenses,
and other extraordinary expenses to the child support obligation.32
The amount of child support owed by each parent is then allocated
based on his or her portion of the combined monthly income.33 The
non-domiciliary parent is required to pay the calculated amount;
whereas, the domiciliary34 parent is merely expected to spend the
calculated amount on the child.35 The income shares model is a
seemingly straightforward way to calculate child support, but this
calculation is more complex when the obligor owes child support
to multiple families.36
B. Multiple Families and the First-Family-First Policy
The child support guidelines were developed to apply to
situations in which an obligor had only one family to support.37
However, obligors frequently have multiple families to support,38
and the method used in Louisiana for determining child support for
subsequent families is almost identical to that used for determining
child support for first families.39 The only difference between the
30. Id. (The amount in the table or grid derives from economic data on a
child’s household expenditures.). See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.19
(Supp. 2012).
31. MORGAN, supra note 7, at § 1.03.
32. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.20, Worksheets A & B (2008). Judges
also have the option to subtract for the child’s income.
33. MORGAN, supra note 7, at § 1.03.
34. See supra note 3.
35. MORGAN, supra note 7, at § 1.03. For example, if a couple had a
combined income of $2,000, each partner contributed 50% to this income, and
no additional expenses needed to be added or subtracted, then, according to the
table in the guidelines, their one child would be awarded $378 per month. The
non-domiciliary parent would pay $189, while the domiciliary parent would be
expected to spend $189 on the child. See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
9:315.8(C)–(D), :315.19–:315.20 (2008 & Supp. 2012).
36. See discussion infra Part I.B.
37. Marygold S. Melli, Guideline Review: The Search for an Equitable
Child Support Formula, in CHILD SUPPORT: THE NEXT FRONTIER 113, 120 (J.
Thomas Oldham & Marygold S. Melli eds., 2000).
38. In 2004, 52.2% of previously divorced men age 25 and older were
married for a second time, and 43.5% of previously divorced women age 25 and
older were married for a second time. TASHA R. HOWE, MARRIAGES & FAMILIES
IN THE 21ST CENTURY: A BIOECOLOGICAL APPROACH 428 (2011). About 50% of
marriages end in divorce. Id. at 407. These statistics indicate that many parents
marry, have children, divorce, then subsequently remarry, have more children,
divorce again and, thus, owe child support to multiple families.
39. See discussion supra Part I.A.
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two calculations is that when determining the amount of child
support owed to a subsequent family, the obligor’s preexisting
child support orders are subtracted from the obligor’s monthly
gross income.40 Because the amount of child support awarded is a
function of the obligor’s monthly gross income, the amount of
money awarded to children from subsequent families is necessarily
less than the amount awarded to prior families.41 For example, if a
couple has two children, and the non-domiciliary parent makes
$2,200 per month while the domiciliary parent makes $0 per
month, the non-domiciliary parent would owe the family a child
support award of $601 per month.42 If the non-domiciliary parent
later has two additional children with a person who makes $0 per
month, the non-domiciliary parent would owe the second family a
child support award of $435 per month.43 Therefore, the obligor’s
first family will automatically receive 24% more money than the
obligor’s second family.44 It is also worthwhile to note that this
disparity in child support awards disproportionally impacts the
second families of less affluent obligors.45
As evidenced by the foregoing example, Louisiana’s child
support guidelines favor the obligor’s prior family over his or her
subsequent family or families. This first-family-first policy46 is
40. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.20 (2008).
41. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.8 (2008).
42. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.19 (Supp. 2012).
43. Id.
44. The calculation can become truly complex when the obligor has more
than two families. For example, if a non-domiciliary parent makes $2,200 per
month and his or her first partner makes $0 per month, their three children
would receive $709 a month. Id. If the non-domiciliary parent later has three
more children with a second partner who also makes $0, those children would
receive $506. Id. If the non-domiciliary parent then has three more children with
a third partner who also makes $0 per month, he or she would owe the third
family $310 per month. Id. If the non-domiciliary parent then has three more
children with a fourth partner who makes $0 per month, the non-domiciliary
parent would owe the fourth family $104 per month. Id. In sum, the obligor’s
first family would receive $709, but his fourth family would receive only $104,
an 85% disparity in child support awards based on the children’s birth order.
This example assumes that there were no additional expenses that needed to be
subtracted from the gross income.
45. For example, the second family of a middle-class obligor making
$6,000 per month, with two children in both families, will receive 13% less
child support than the obligor’s first family. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.19
(Supp. 2012). The second family of a poor obligor, making $1,300 per month
with two children in both families, will receive 27% less child support than the
obligor’s first family. See id.
46. See D.A. Rollie Thompson, The Second Family Conundrum in Child
Support, 18 CAN. J. FAM. L. 227, 250 (2001) (highlighting that child support
guidelines preferring prior children to subsequent children employ the first-

2012]

COMMENT

301

based on a “religious and moral hostility to divorce”47 and the idea
that parents should not be able to relieve themselves of their
financial responsibilities to children of their previous marriages by
voluntarily incurring additional financial obligations to a
subsequent family.48 The policy is meant to deter divorce and to
prevent the first family from being “forced onto the welfare rolls,
while [the obligor] goes about creating a second family.”49
Regardless of these arguably positive intentions, many Louisianans
are dissatisfied with how the policy calculates support for multiple
families.50
C. Attempts to Remove the First-Family-First Policy from
Louisiana’s Guidelines
Because the guidelines are intended to apply to single family
situations, multiple family cases are a challenging area of guideline
development.51 Louisiana family law practitioners, parents, and
lawmakers have repeatedly acknowledged issues with the
adequacy and fairness of the guidelines.52 Of those Louisianans

family-first policy). “‘First family first’ predominates in the United States, both
in the strong legislative preference for ‘prior’ children and the limited deviation
permitted for ‘subsequent’ children.” Id. at 265. See also HARRY D. KRAUSE,
CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA: THE LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 20 (1981). Although it is
not explicitly stated that Louisiana implements the first-family-first policy, the
guidelines condone the first-family-first policy. See 2000 FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 10, at 25 (describing how Louisiana uses a
form of the first-family-first policy to calculate multiple family support).
47. See Thompson, supra note 46, at 255–56 (Moreover, the first-familyfirst policy conveys that “[a] lower standard of living for the second family is
the proper result, because of the primacy of birth order and the need for a
deterrent and sanction to payors.”); Spaht, supra note 8, at 736 (Louisiana
advocates of the policy argue that giving all of the obligor’s children the same
amount of support, regardless of whether they were born to the first or second
family, would significantly damage the security of the marriage promise.).
48. See Spaht, supra note 8, at 736.
49. See Thompson, supra note 46, at 256; see also Spaht, supra note 8, at
736 (discussing Louisiana’s goals behind the first-family-first policy).
50. See infra note 54.
51. Marianne Takas, Improving Child Support Guidelines: Can Simple
Formulas Address Complex Families?, 26 FAM. L.Q. 171, 179 (1992).
52. See Spaht, supra note 8, at 735 (“The issue of how to treat additional
dependents was a ‘major issue for a substantial portion of guidelines users in
Louisiana.’”); REVIEW OF LOUISIANA'S CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES: 2004
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES REVIEW
PURSUANT TO LSA RS 9:315.16 25 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS] (“The phenomenon of second and subsequent families is
an ever-increasing problem in the family law arena.”); infra note 54.
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polled in a 2004 study, 55.3% found the guidelines applying to
multiple families to be “Inadequate to Very Inadequate.”53 In the
2008 Regular Legislative Session, by recommendation of the
Louisiana State Law Institute, one Louisiana senator proposed that
the guidelines be amended to remove the first-family-first policy.54
The fundamental objective of this proposal was to treat multiple
families equally.55 The bill failed,56 but this proposal indicates that
some Louisianans believe that equal protection of the obligor’s

53. 2004 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 52, at 24. In
compliance with federal regulations, state legislatures must review their child
support guidelines, with the consultation of the child support review committee,
every four years in order to ensure the continued effectiveness of guidelines. 42
U.S.C. § 667(a) (2011); 45 C.F.R. § 302.56 (2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:315.16 (Supp. 2012). If the guideline review indicates the need for change, the
legislature is to amend the guidelines accordingly. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:315.16 (Supp. 2012). In Louisiana, the last quadrennial review occurred in
2008. CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES REVIEW: 2008 QUADRENNIAL REPORT 3–4
(2008) [hereinafter 2008 QUADRENNIAL REPORT]. The Louisiana Legislature
gave the responsibility of reviewing Louisiana’s child support guidelines to the
Office of Family Support, Support Enforcement Services of the Department of
Social Services and the Louisiana District Attorneys’ Association in
consultation with the Child Support Review Committee. Id. The Child Support
Review Committee identified issues for review by reaching out to the public. Id.
The Committee surveyed judges, hearing officers presiding over matters
involving child support, members of the Family Law Section of the Louisiana
State Bar Association, and approximately 300 domiciliary and non-domiciliary
parents receiving services within the child support agency, as well as those
domiciliary and non-domiciliary parents not receiving services. Id. One issue
identified for review was the application of the current child support guidelines
to cases involving multiple families. Id. at 13. This issue was also raised in the
2000 and 2004 reports. See 2000 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note
10, at 24–31 (in which the issue of what to do with additional dependents was
debated); 2004 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 52, at 24 (in
which the Child Support Review Committee acknowledged that “the
phenomenon of second and subsequent families is an ever-increasing problem in
the family law arena” and that 55.3% of respondents to the Louisiana Child
Support Guidelines User Survey of 2003 found the guidelines applying to
multiple families to be “Inadequate to Very Inadequate.”).
54. See S. 605, 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2008), available at http://www.
legis.state.la.us/billdata/streamdocument.asp?did=473066 (The proposal would
reenact Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:315.14 as Louisiana Revised
Statutes section 315.8.1.).
55. Id. (“The fundamental policy objective in multiple support cases is to
treat children of separate households with a common parent equally in the
establishment of a base child support obligation.”).
56. See Instrument Information: SB605—2008 Reg. Sess., http://www.
legis.state.la.us/billdata/History.asp?sessionid=08RS&billid=SB605 (last visited
Oct. 8, 2012) (The bill was referred to the committee on Judiciary A but never
went any further.).
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children would be the best option for multiple family cases.57 This
belief is well-founded because the current guidelines create a
discriminatory classification that violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.58
II. ASSESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LOUISIANA’S BIRTH
ORDER-BASED DISCRIMINATION THROUGH THE LENS OF
ILLEGITIMACY-BASED DISCRIMINATION
By classifying an obligor’s children based on birth order,59 the
Louisiana child support guidelines deny subsequently born
children equal protection under the law and are therefore
unconstitutional.60
Illegitimate children are children born to unmarried parents.61
Historically, the government has discriminated against illegitimate
children by denying them equal protection under the law.62
57. See supra note 54.
58. “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Also, the first-familyfirst policy violates the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 which states that “No
person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. . . . No law shall
arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against a person because
of birth . . . .” LA. CONST. art. I, § 3. See also discussion infra Part II. To the
author’s knowledge, neither the Louisiana Child Support Review Committee nor
any Louisiana congressperson has requested that the guidelines be amended
because they are unconstitutional. Moreover, the constitutionality of the firstfamily-first policy has not received much scholarly attention in Louisiana or in
other states. But see Blakesley, supra note 26, at 608 (“Where a paying parent
has undertaken additional obligations, including marrying again and fathering
other children, he will not be excused from his primary obligation to support his
non-custodial child. This, of course, gives a privileged position to the children of
the first marriage, raising the question of whether this preference for one’s first
family is constitutional?”). See generally Rebecca Burton Garland, Second
Children Second Best? Equal Protection for Successive Families Under State
Child Support Guidelines, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 881 (1991) (for a broad
discussion regarding the constitutionality of first family first).
59. See supra note 10.
60. See supra note 58.
61. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (see specifically, LA. CIV.
CODE art. 238 (2011)).
62. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505–06 (1976) (“[T]he law has long
placed the illegitimate child in an inferior position relative to the legitimate in
certain circumstances, particularly in regard to obligations of support or other
aspects of family law.”). For examples of these discriminatory classifications,
see Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (in which the state
disfavored illegitimate children over legitimate children with regards to parental
death benefits); N.J. Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (in
which the state disfavored illegitimate children over legitimate children with
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Illegitimacy-based discrimination persisted until 1968, when the
U.S. Supreme Court held that denying children rights based on
their legitimacy is unconstitutional.63 However, despite the
extreme similarities between illegitimacy-based classifications and
birth order-based classifications,64 Louisiana courts have yet to
hold the child support guidelines unconstitutional.65
A. Similarities Between Birth Order-Based Classifications and
Illegitimacy-Based Classifications
Similar to illegitimacy-based classifications, birth order-based
classifications stem from immutable characteristics,66 punish
children based on the relationship or marital status of their
parents,67 and impact a child’s ability to receive essential financial
benefits.68 Such similarities are important to recognize because
these characteristics have led courts to declare illegitimacy-based
classifications unconstitutional.69

regards to welfare benefits); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (in
which the state disfavored illegitimate children over legitimate children with
regards to Social Security disability benefits); Matthews, 427 U.S. 495 (in which
the state disfavored illegitimate children over legitimate children with regards to
survivor’s benefits under the Social Security Act).
63. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71–72 (1968) (A state cannot deny
children the right to recover based on their illegitimacy. Illegitimate children are
subject to all of the responsibilities owed by American citizens and thus cannot
be “denied correlative rights which other citizens enjoy.”). Since Levy,
illegitimacy-based classifications have largely disappeared in the legal
landscape. See generally Mathews, 427 U.S. at 505–506; Trimble v. Gordon,
430 U.S. 762 (1977); Jimenez, 417 U.S. 628; Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535
(1973); Weber, 406 U.S. 164; Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971); Glona v.
Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
64. See discussion infra Part II.A.
65. See supra note 10.
66. This Comment argues that, like illegitimacy, a person’s birth order is an
immutable characteristic because it is determined solely by the “accident of
birth.” Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). See discussion infra
Part II.A.1.
67. While illegitimacy-based classifications punish children based on their
parents not being married at the time of their children’s birth, Louisiana’s birth
order-based classifications punish children because their parent has procreated
with multiple partners.
68. A state cannot deny a child support because the child is illegitimate.
Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973). Likewise, Louisiana should not
diminish a child’s support simply because he or she was born later. See
discussion infra Part II.A.3.
69. See discussion infra Part II.A.1–3.
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1. Immutable Characteristics
The Court uses a heightened form of scrutiny70 when the
characteristic defining the class is an immutable one, that is, one
outside of the person’s control.71 Illegitimacy is an immutable
characteristic72 “because children born out-of-wedlock cannot
control the status of their birth and cannot force their parents to
legitimate them through subsequent marriage.”73 Immutable
characteristics are “determined solely by the accident of birth.”74 A
person has no control over whether his or her parents were married
at the time of his or her birth, and illegitimacy “bears no relation to
the individual’s ability to participate in and contribute to
society.”75
These considerations apply equally to birth order
classifications. A person likewise has no control over his or her
birth order and cannot control whether his or her parents choose to
70. The Supreme Court applies one of three levels of scrutiny depending on
the type of class. Note, supra note 19, at 1147–50. The first, and toughest, level
is strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny applies to suspect classifications. Id. at 1148.
For a court to apply strict scrutiny, the legislature must have either significantly
abridged a fundamental right or passed a law that involves a suspect
classification. Id. A suspect class is one that has been “saddled with such
disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or
relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.” San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). Suspect classifications
include race, national origin, and religion. Laws discriminating against these
classes must be “narrowly tailored” to further a “compelling governmental
interest.” Note, supra note 19, at 1149. The second, and less strict, level is
heightened–intermediate scrutiny. Intermediate scrutiny applies to
classifications based on sex, alienage, illegitimacy, and mental retardation. See
id. These classifications must be “substantially related” to an “important”
governmental interest. Id. at 1152. The third, and weakest, level is rational basis
scrutiny. Rational basis scrutiny applies to classifications based on different
reasons than those described above. Id. at 1148. These classifications must be
“reasonably related” to a “legitimate” governmental interest in order to be
constitutional. Id.
71. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686.
72. The Supreme Court considers illegitimacy, sex, race, and national origin
immutable characteristics. See id.; Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976)
(“[T]he legal status of illegitimacy, however defined, is, like race or national
origin, a characteristic determined by causes not within the control of the
illegitimate individual.”).
73. Julie E. Goodwin, Not All Children Are Created Equal: A Proposal to
Address Equal Protection Inheritance Rights of Posthumously Conceived
Children, 4 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 234, 245 n.76 (2005). See also Mathews, 427
U.S. 495.
74. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686.
75. Id.
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have additional children with other partners. Birth order is
determined solely by the accident of birth, and the order of an
individual’s birth is not related to his or her ability to participate in
and contribute to society.76 Since birth order is immutable, birth
order-based classifications should be analyzed under heightened
scrutiny.77
2. Both Types of Classification Unjustly Punish Children Based
on Their Parents’ Relationship or Marital Status
Illegitimacy-based classifications punish children based on their
parents’ not being married at the time of their birth. These
classifications intend to discourage parents from having children
out-of-wedlock.78 But, financially disadvantaging a child in order to
express society’s disapproval of the parent’s liaisons “is illogical
and unjust.”79 As the Supreme Court of the United States has noted:
[I]mposing disabilities on illegitimate children is contrary
to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should
bear some relationship to individual responsibility or
wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth
and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual—as
well as an unjust—way of deterring the parent.80
76. Id. at 686–87 (Gender-based classifications are subject to intermediate
scrutiny because:
what differentiates sex from such non-suspect statuses as intelligence or
physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is
that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to
perform or contribute to society. As a result, statutory distinctions
between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating the
entire class of females to inferior legal status without regard to the
actual capabilities of its individual members. (citations omitted)).
Likewise, a person’s birth order should not relegate him or her to an inferior
legal status when birth order bears no relation to the ability to perform or
contribute to society.
77. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
78. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968).
79. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). In Weber,
the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a Louisiana workman’s compensation law
that allowed illegitimate children to recover for their parent’s death only if the
parent’s legitimate children had not already exhausted the benefits. The
Supreme Court held that this classification violated the Equal Protection Clause
because the classification was not related to the State’s interest in promoting
legitimate family relationships. Although equal allocation of the benefits
between the legitimate and illegitimate children takes money away from the
legitimate children, the Court’s opinion indicates that this reallocation is
sometimes necessary in order to comply with the Constitution.
80. Id.
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Thus, a state may not “attempt to influence the actions of men and
women by imposing sanctions on the children born of their
illegitimate relationships.”81
This “illogical and unjust” financial disadvantage was a
justification for striking down illegitimacy-based classifications.82
Likewise, it should justify striking down birth order classifications
that similarly punish children based on their parents’ conduct. These
classifications penalize subsequently born children because their
parents have procreated with multiple partners. However, no child
however, is responsible for the liaisons of his or her parents.
Therefore, penalizing subsequently born children based on their
parents’ conduct is an ineffectual and unjust method for deterring
parents.83
3. Child’s Right to Receive Financial Benefits
Illegitimacy-based and birth order-based classifications are also
analogous because both classifications involve a child’s right to
receive financial benefits.84 The Supreme Court in Gomez v. Perez
held that “once a State posits a judicially enforceable right on
behalf of children to needed support from their natural fathers there
is no constitutionally sufficient justification for denying such an
essential right to a child simply because its natural father has not
married its mother.”85 Louisiana gives all children a judicially
enforceable right to support86 but denies a subsequently born child
81. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769 (1977). Trimble was
distinguished by Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978). In Lalli, the Court upheld a
law requiring that illegitimate children be acknowledged by their fathers in order
to inherit from them. Also, in Mathews v. Lucas, the Court distinguished
Trimble by upholding a law that forced illegitimate children to prove their
dependence upon a deceased parent in order to inherit from that parent. 427 U.S.
495 (1976). These distinctions, however, bear no relation to Louisiana’s child
support guidelines because the children obtaining support have previously been
declared dependents of the obligor. Thus, there is no question of whether the
child is truly entitled to support from the father.
82. Weber, 406 U.S. at 175.
83. See id.
84. See supra note 68.
85. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973). See also Clark v. Jeter, 486
U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (citing Gomez, 409 U.S. at 538) (This assertion was
distinguished by the Court in Clark v. Jeter, where the Court acknowledged that
in some cases it may be appropriate to treat illegitimate children differently in
the support context because of “lurking problems with respect to proof of
paternity.” However, in Louisiana, proving paternity is not a problem when the
issue of child support is involved because a father’s paternity is inherent in his
owing a child support obligation.); supra note 80.
86. LA. CIV. CODE art. 141 (2011).
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the right to receive as much support as a prior born child. Since no
constitutionally sufficient justification exists for denying a child
support simply because the child is illegitimate,87 there cannot be a
constitutionally sufficient justification for diminishing a child’s
right to support simply because he or she was born later.
Due to the profound similarities between birth order-based
classifications and illegitimacy-based classifications, it stands to
reason that judges should assess the constitutionality of Louisiana’s
child support guidelines using the same level of judicial scrutiny.
B. Intermediate Scrutiny Analysis
Courts review illegitimacy-based classifications under the
intermediate scrutiny standard.88 In order to survive intermediate
scrutiny, a classification must be “substantially related”89 to an
“important”90 governmental interest.91
87. Gomez, 409 U.S. at 538.
88. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 504 (1976) (Illegitimate children are a
quasi-suspect class, and classifications based on illegitimacy are subject to
intermediate scrutiny.). See also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1976).
Throughout the Supreme Court’s review of illegitimacy-based classifications,
the Court has used several standards of review before settling on the
intermediate scrutiny standard. See Kathleen M. Overcash, Constitutional Law—
Equal Protection—State’s Denial of Right to Inherit Intestate Succession Based
on Illegitimate Status Invalidated, 52 TUL. L. REV. 406 (1978) (providing
examples of the various standards).
89. There is no precise way to determine whether the classification is
substantially related to a governmental interest. In Levy v. Louisiana, the State’s
classification was not substantially related because the illegitimate children had
nothing to do with the harm inflicted on their mother. 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968). In
Trimble v. Gordon, the classification was not substantially related because,
“parents have the ability to conform their conduct to societal norms, but their
illegitimate children can affect neither their parents’ conduct nor their own
status.” 430 U.S. at 770. In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, the
Court held that the classification was not substantially related because
condemning a child for his or her parents’ irresponsible liaisons beyond the
bonds of marriage is “illogical and unjust” and “contrary to the basic concept of
our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual
responsibility or wrongdoing.” 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). In Labine v. Vincent,
however, the State’s interest in establishing a method of proper distribution for a
decedent’s property was important enough to justify discrimination. 401 U.S.
532 (1971). The classification was substantially related to the State’s interest
because of the difficulties involved with proving paternity and the related danger
of spurious claims. Id. at 552–58. Nevertheless, the Labine case is not applicable
to Louisiana’s guidelines; proving paternity is irrelevant in establishing or
modifying child support for multiple families because the obligor’s paternity is
inherent in his owing the obligation. See id.; supra note 85; infra note 90.
90. There is no precise way to determine whether a government’s interest is
“important,” but the U.S. Supreme Court has deemed certain interests as not
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1. The State’s Interest Is Not Important Enough to
Discriminate Against Subsequent Children
Louisiana uses a first-family-first policy in order to deter
divorce and to ensure that the obligor does not relieve himself of
the financial responsibility that he owes to his first family.92 Yet,
neither of these interests is important enough to withstand
intermediate scrutiny.
Despite the fact that divorce may have negative effects on
children,93 the State’s interest in deterring divorce does not justify
the discriminatory classification of subsequently born children. In
Trimble v. Gordon, the Supreme Court of the United States
declared unconstitutional a Louisiana law that prohibited
illegitimate children from inheriting through their fathers.94 The
Court decided that Louisiana’s interest in promoting legitimate
family relationships,95 i.e., encouraging parents to marry before
having children, was not important enough for the illegitimacybased classification to withstand judicial scrutiny because children
cannot do anything to promote their legitimacy.96
The unconstitutional law in Trimble is similar to Louisiana’s
child support guidelines because both punish children for their
parents’ conduct even though children cannot control this
conduct.97 Since the Supreme Court determined that promoting

important enough to justify an illegitimacy-based classification. In Trimble v.
Gordon, the State’s interest in encouraging legitimate (i.e., marriage-based)
family relationships was not important enough to discriminate against
illegitimate children. 430 U.S. at 770. In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
the State’s interests in promoting legitimate family relationships and minimizing
problems of proof were not important enough to discriminate against illegitimate
children. 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). In Levy v. Louisiana, discouraging
illegitimate births was not important enough to discriminate against illegitimate
children. 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968).
91. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
92. See Spaht, supra note 8, at 736.
93. See generally BRIDGET MAHER, DETERRING DIVORCE 7–9 (2004),
available at http://downloads.frc.org/EF/EF04E17.pdf (In some cases, divorce
may result in emotional and behavioral problems, less education, illegal drug
use, out-of-wedlock childbearing, depression and suicide, less economic
achievement, higher risk of divorce, and weak family relationships.).
94. Trimble, 430 U.S. 762.
95. “The Louisiana categories are consistent with a theory of social
opprobrium regarding the parents’ relationships and with a measured, if
misguided, attempt to deter illegitimate relationships.” Id. at 768 n.13.
96. Id. at 770.
97. Subsequently born children cannot do anything to prevent one of their
parents from divorcing a former spouse.
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legitimate family relationships is not important enough to allow
discrimination against illegitimate children,98 Louisiana’s interest
in deterring divorce cannot be important enough to allow
discrimination against the obligor’s subsequent children.
Furthermore, the State’s interest in ensuring that the obligor does
not relieve himself of his financial responsibilities to his first family
is not important enough to survive intermediate scrutiny. The logic
from Trimble also applies to this interest because the State punishes
subsequently born children even though they cannot do anything to
ensure that their parents continue to pay child support to their first
families.99 Further, even though protecting an obligor’s first family
is important, the protection of his second family is equally
important. Parents have an obligation to support all of their
children;100 however, the first-family-first policy subordinates the
second family’s needs to the needs of the first family.101 Because the
obligor has an equal duty to support all of his children,102 the State
should be interested in protecting the financial needs of all the
obligor’s children. Hence, the financial needs of prior families
should not trump the financial needs of subsequent families, and
neither of the State’s interests is important enough to justify
Louisiana’s birth order-based classification.
2. The First-Family-First Policy is not Substantially Related to
the State’s Interest
In addition to requiring that the governmental interests be
important, the intermediate scrutiny analysis requires that the
98. See Trimble, 430 U.S. 762.
99. A child cannot control whether a parent pays his obligation to another
family—i.e., whether the parent chooses to relieve himself of his financial
responsibilities to his first family.
100. Laiche v. Laiche, 111 So. 2d 120, 122 (La. 1959). See also LA. CIV.
CODE art. 227 (2011) (parents have a duty to support children of marriage); id.
art. 240 (parents have a duty to support children not of marriage).
101. See discussion supra Part I.B; see also Martinez v. Martinez, 660 A.2d
13, 17 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1995). The New Jersey Superior Court
described problems with first family first, as follows:
Family one sees such applications as an unfair erosion of their standard
of living directly caused by the obligor’s unwillingness to recognize
that if he cannot support the children of the first relationship, he should
have refrained from having more; and family two, primarily the new
spouse or paramour, perceives such strident opposition as nothing more
than a ‘cake for you, crumbs for me’ response, a contest fought for her
and for her child’s survival. Ofttimes, as here, there are enough grains
of truth to fill many a sack.
Id.
102. See supra note 99.
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classification be substantially related to those interests.103 The firstfamily-first policy fails to meet the substantial relationship
requirement for two major reasons. First, the policy is ineffective
at deterring divorce because couples considering divorce are not
likely to contemplate the first-family-first policy beforehand.104 In
Weber, the Court held that people will not “shun illicit relations
because the offspring may not one day reap the benefits of
workmen’s compensation.”105 In the same vein, parents are
unlikely to shun divorce simply because their subsequent children
may not receive as much child support as their prior children.106
This notion is supported by statistics conveying the frequency of
divorce.107
Second, the first-family-first policy is not substantially related
to the State’s interest in deterring divorce because, in many cases
the parents from the first family were never married.108 Despite the
State’s goal in deterring divorce, the child support guidelines are
blind to whether the obligor was married or not.109 In cases where
the parents were not married, the State’s goal in deterring divorce
is impossible to achieve. Moreover, in cases where the obligor’s
first marriage occurred within the second family, the guidelines
contradict the State’s interest. Louisiana’s birth order-based
classification often does nothing to deter marriage and sometimes
violates the State’s goal. The classification, therefore, is not
substantially related to the State’s interest.
The discriminatory classification of subsequent children in the
Louisiana child support guidelines is unconstitutional because the
classification fails to survive intermediate scrutiny. Because
Louisiana must comply with the Constitution,110 its legislature
103. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
104. Notwithstanding the Trimble decision, in the author’s opinion, it seems
preposterous for the State to assume that a parent contemplating divorce will
consider the first-family-first policy or be persuaded by the fact that his or her
future children may someday receive less child support money than his or her
current children.
105. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173 (1972).
106. See supra note 103.
107. See supra note 38.
108. “About 53 percent of first births that occurred between 1990 and 1994 to
women 15 to 29 years old were either born out of wedlock or conceived before the
women’s first marriage.” Amara Bachu, Trends in Martial Status of U.S. Women
at First Birth: 1930 to 1994, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (March 1998), http://www.
census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0020/twps0020.html.
109. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:315–:315.47 (2008 & Supp. 2012).
110. “This Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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needs to find a constitutional policy for calculating multiple family
support orders. Fortunately, there are alternative, constitutional
policies that address the policy problems inherent in first family
first.111
III. LOUISIANA IGNORES BETTER POLICY ALTERNATIVES FOR
CALCULATING MULTIPLE FAMILY SUPPORT ORDERS
Notwithstanding serious constitutional concerns,112 the
guidelines also present various social policy issues. This Part
conducts a policy analysis to explain alternatives to first family
first,113 to describe what criteria the Legislature should evaluate
when searching for a new policy,114 and to apply those criteria to
the alternatives in order to determine the best choice for
Louisiana.115 The preferred alternative is an equalization policy
that is constitutional, results in awards that are in the best interest
of all the obligor’s children, and is perceived as fair by the
obligor’s children.116
A. Available Alternatives
In its effort to better calculate support for multiple families, the
Louisiana Legislature needs to analyze alternative policies.117 Such
alternatives to first family first may include: using a secondfamily-first policy,118 treating subsequent children as a defense
against an upward modification,119 treating subsequent children as

111. See discussion infra Part III.C.
112. See discussion supra Part II.
113. See discussion infra Part III.A. This section briefly explains policy
alternatives.
114. See discussion infra Part III.B.
115. See discussion infra Part III.C.
116. See discussion infra Part III.C.5.
117. “Very broadly three approaches can be found in U.S. guidelines: (i)
ignore prior or subsequent children; (ii) allow a ‘deduction’ from income for a
prior or subsequent child; or (iii) make the prior or subsequent child a ground for
downward ‘deviation.’” Thompson, supra note 46, at 250.
118. States that use second family first include: Colorado, Iowa, Missouri,
North Carolina, and Vermont. Morgan, supra note 7, at § 3.04[b].
119. States that use this policy include: Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, and West Virginia. Morgan, supra
note 7, at § 3.04[b] n.136; Thompson, supra note 46, at 250.
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a cause for downward modification,120 and equalizing all of the
obligor’s children.121
1. Second Family First
When searching for a new policy, the Legislature may evaluate
the second-family-first policy employed by some states.122 This
policy, however, is merely the opposite of first family first and is
no better at calculating multiple family support.123 Second family
first suggests that the second family’s needs trump the first
family’s needs.124 Thus, when considering the amount of support
owed to the first family, the court will consider the needs of the
obligor’s second family and deduct the amount needed to support
the second family from the income used to determine the first
family’s award.125 Accordingly, the second family will receive
more support than the first family, so, like first family first, this
policy is also unconstitutional.
2. Subsequent Children as a Defense Against Upward
Modification126
Some states permit the obligor to assert that he or she is
supporting subsequent children as a defense in cases where the
domiciliary parent files suit to increase a preexisting child support
order.127 In its 2008 review of the child support guidelines,
120. States using this policy include: Alaska, California, and Idaho. Morgan,
supra note 7, at § 3.04[b] n.137.
121. States that use the equalization policy include New Jersey. See N.J. CT.
R. 5:1–:8 app. IX; see also N.J. CT. R. 5:6A (“The guidelines set forth in
Appendix IX of these Rules shall be applied when an application to establish or
modify child support is considered by the court.”).
122. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
123. See discussion infra Part III.C.2.
124. See discussion infra Part III.C.2.
125. Id.; MARIANNE TAKAS, THE TREATMENT OF MULTIPLE FAMILY CASES
UNDER STATE CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES 2, 23–24 (1991).
126. See Chapter Nine, supra note 25 (“Courts often treat subsequently born
children differently, depending on whether the obligor is raising the issue
‘offensively’ or ‘defensively.’ In other words, courts are reluctant to allow an
obligor to modify an order based on the need to support subsequently born
children. They are more receptive to recognizing subsequent children as a
defense to an obligee’s motion to increase support.”).
127. See Thompson, supra note 46, at 250. A parent’s attempt to either
increase or decrease a preexisting child support order is known as a modification
proceeding. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 142 (2011) (“An award of child support may
be modified if the circumstances of the child or of either parent materially
change and shall be terminated upon proof that it has become unnecessary.”). In
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Louisiana’s Child Support Review Committee recommended that
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:315.12 be amended to
implement such a policy.128 Nevertheless, the Legislature did not
adopt the Committee’s suggestion.129
3. Subsequent Children as Cause for Downward Modification
A policy that allows subsequent children to be considered a
cause for downward modification allows obligors to reduce
preexisting child support orders when the obligor is supporting
children from subsequent families.130 Currently in Louisiana, an
obligor cannot assert that he is supporting additional children as
grounds for reducing a prior child support obligation.131

Louisiana, the only way an obligor can use his second family as a defense
against upward modification is by proving that he or she has taken a second job
or is working overtime to provide for the second family. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:315.12 (2008).
128. See 2008 QUADRENNIAL REPORT, supra note 53, at 13. The proposed
modification to Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:315.12 included:
Second Multiple families; second jobs and overtime; additional
dependents
A. The court may consider the interests of a subsequent family as a
defense in an action to modify an existing child support order when the
obligor has taken a second job or works overtime to provide for a
subsequent family. However, the obligor bears the burden of proof in
establishing that the additional income is used to provide for the
subsequent family.
(1) The court may consider the expenses of the obligor for the support
of children from a subsequent family as a defense in a proceeding to
modify an existing child support order. The obligor has the burden of
proving by documentary evidence both the parent-child relationship
and the amount of support being provided to additional dependents.
(Words which are struck through were proposed deletions from the
existing statute, while words underscored were proposed additions).
129. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.12 (2008).
130. Id.
131. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 142 cmt. b (2011). An obligor can reduce a
preexisting child support order only when his circumstances have materially
changed. LA. CIV. CODE art. 142 (2011). Subsequent children, however, are not
considered a material change because the State does not want prior children to
suffer financially due to the voluntary acts of their parents. Laiche v. Laiche,
111 So. 2d 120, 122 (La. 1959) (“[I]t would be contrary to the letter and spirit of
the law to conclude that one required to pay alimony should be relieved
therefrom, either wholly or partially, when he has brought about his own
unstable financial condition by voluntarily incurring subsequent obligations,
secondary to the alimony obligation, which render him unable to meet that
obligation.”). Nevertheless, why should the court’s logic in Laiche not equally
apply to subsequently born children? Why should subsequently born children

2012]

COMMENT

315

4. Equalization of Obligor’s Children
Equalization is the “equal treatment” of all the obligor’s
children and is premised on the idea that “had the parents stayed
together and produced additional children, there would have been
adjustments and a likely reduction in the resources available for the
first child.”132 The equalization policy is exemplified by New
Jersey’s child support guidelines.133 Similar to Louisiana, New
Jersey judges subtract preexisting child support orders from the
obligor’s income when calculating child support for the obligor’s
subsequent family.134 However, New Jersey’s guidelines differ
from Louisiana’s guidelines because, after using the formula to
determine the subsequent family’s child support order, New Jersey
judges have the option to “either average the obligor’s orders or
fashion some other equitable resolution in order to treat all
supported children fairly under the guidelines.”135
Equalization and the other mentioned policies may be better at
calculating support for multiple families than first family first.
Accordingly, the Louisiana Legislature should evaluate the
advantages and disadvantages of each policy.
B. Criteria that Must Be Evaluated in Order to Make the Best
Policy Choice
The Legislature must be mindful of certain criteria when
evaluating these alternatives to first family first. The evaluation
criteria must include whether the policy: (1) is constitutionally
sound, (2) results in awards that are in the best interest of all the
obligor’s children, and (3) results in awards that are perceived as
fair by the obligor’s children.136

suffer due to the voluntary obligations that their parents incurred before their
birth?
132. Martha Minow, How Should We Think About Child Support
Obligations?, in FATHERS UNDER FIRE: THE REVOLUTION IN CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT 315 (Irwin Garfinkel et al. eds., 1998).
133. N.J. CT. R. 5:1–:8 app. IX.
134. Id. at app. IX-B. See also discussion supra Part II.B.
135. N.J. CT. R. 5:1–:8 app. IX-A. See also discussion supra Part II.C (In
Louisiana, an equalization policy was recommended to the legislature in 2008,
but the bill died in committee.).
136. These criteria need not be the Legislature’s only considerations when
searching for a new policy. However, these three criteria are necessary to the
Legislature’s evaluation because Louisiana must comply with the U.S.
Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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1. Constitutionality
An evaluation of whether an alternative policy violates the
Equal Protection Clause is fundamental in determining whether the
alternative should be implemented because Louisiana law must
comply with the Constitution of the United States.137 The
constitutional evaluation of the alternatives to first family first will
examine whether the policy creates a birth order-based
classification and, if so, whether that classification is substantially
related to an important governmental interest.138 If the policy does
not create a discriminatory classification, then no further
constitutional evaluation is necessary.
2. Best Interest of All the Obligor’s Children
A thorough analysis of the alternative policies must consider
whether the amount of support calculated through application of
the policy would be in the best interest of all the obligor’s
children.139 This is an important factor in the Legislature’s
evaluation because every state’s child support guidelines presume
that the amount of support awarded via the guidelines is in the best
interest of the child.140 Therefore, in order for this presumption to
be accurate for all the obligor’s children, the chosen policy should
137. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
138. Such birth order-based classifications will be subject to intermediate
scrutiny. See discussion supra Part III.B.
139. Sarah McGinnis, You Are Not the Father: How State Paternity Laws
Protect (and Fail to Protect) the Best Interests of Children, 16 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 311, 313 (The best interest of the children is important
because “[f]amily law cases involving children operate under a single guiding
principle: children’s well-being is the paramount concern in any judge’s
decision.” (citation omitted)). The best interest of the child standard is used by
courts to determine what arrangements would be to a child’s greatest benefit.
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 181 (9th ed. 2009). The best interest of the child
standard is “extremely vague.” Blakesley, supra note 26, at 638.
140. MORGAN, supra note 7, at § 1.02. Notably, the author suggests the
following:
There shall be a rebuttable presumption, in any judicial or
administrative proceeding for the award of child support, that the
amount of the award which would result from the application of such
guidelines is the correct amount of child support to be awarded. A
written finding or specific finding on the record that the application of
the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in a particular case, as
determined under criteria established by the State, shall be sufficient to
rebut the presumption in that case.
Id. See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:315.1(A), 9:315.1(B)(1), 9:315.1 cmt. a
(2008 & Supp. 2012). The guidelines create a presumption that the amount
resulting from their application is correct and in the best interest of the child.
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calculate all child support orders in proportion to the obligor’s total
income.141 By ensuring that both prior and subsequent families
receive child support awards that are proportionate to the obligor’s
total income, the guidelines will render child support awards that
are in the best interest of all families.
3. Perceived Fairness by the Obligor’s Children
Evaluating whether the obligor’s children would perceive the
amount of support calculated by application of the policy as fair is
the final component of this analysis because “unequal child
support awards between prior and subsequent children could create
feelings of inferiority in the subsequent children.”142 When the law
favors one family,143 the subsequent, non-favored family may feel
that the law deems it less important than the prior, favored
family.144 Moreover, studies suggest that children equate fairness
with exact equality, regardless of the purpose of the parent’s
141. For purposes of this Comment, total income refers to situations where
the court does not subtract preexisting child support orders from the obligor’s
income when calculating support for the subsequent family. For a policy to
render awards that are in the best interest of all the obligor’s children, the policy
should calculate each family’s child support order without subtracting
preexisting child support orders. Obviously it would be in the best interest of a
family, either prior or subsequent, to be the only family entitled to a support
award that is proportionate to the obligor’s total income because that family
would get more money than the obligor’s other family. However, the
presumption that the amount awarded by application of the guidelines is in the
best interest of the child applies to both children from prior and subsequent
families. Thus, in order for this presumption to be true, the chosen policy should
award support in proportion to the obligor’s total income for all families.
142. Misti N. Nelc, Inequitable Distribution: The Effect of Minnesota’s Child
Support Guidelines on Prior and Subsequent Children, 17 LAW & INEQ. 97, 114
(1999).
143. I.e., when the law allows one family to receive more money than the
other family.
144. Also, the nonfavored children may feel that the obligor loves them less.
See Nelc, supra note 142, at 114 (“One policy issue that should be taken into
consideration is that unequal child support awards between prior children and
subsequent children could create feelings of inferiority in the subsequent
children. Since they are less favored by the law, they may feel less favored and
less loved by the obligor.”). See generally WILLIAM R. BEER, STRANGERS IN THE
HOUSE: THE WORLD OF STEPSIBLINGS AND HALF-SIBLINGS (1989) (describing
the relationship between siblings who share only one parent); Susan M. McHale
& Terese M. Pawletko, Differential Treatment of Siblings in Two Family
Contexts, 63 CHILD DEV. 68, 68 (1992) (“[C]hildren who perceive their own
treatment as less favorable [than their siblings] may experience a host of
negative affective reactions that may be manifested in adjustment difficulties or
in problematic sibling relationships.”).
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behavior.145 Thus, an alternative’s perceived fairness will be
determined by whether the policy favors one set of children over
the other and whether the policy’s application results in unequal
child support awards that would likely engender feelings of
inferiority among the obligor’s children.146 By evaluating whether
the proposed alternatives are perceived to be fair by the obligor’s
children, in addition to evaluating whether the policy is
constitutional and in the best interest of all children, Louisiana can
find a better policy for calculating support in multiple family cases.
C. Criteria Applied to the First-Family-First Policy and the Policy
Alternatives
When deciding whether to keep the first-family-first policy or
adopt a new policy, the Louisiana Legislature needs to determine
whether the policy meets the aforementioned criteria.147
1. First Family First
The first-family-first policy is not the best choice for Louisiana
because it fails to satisfy any of the criteria. In addition, this policy
is unconstitutional because it creates a discriminatory classification
that is not substantially related to an important government
interest.148
First family first does not result in awards that are in the best
interest of all the obligor’s children. The first family receives an
award that is proportionate to the obligor’s total income, while the
second family receives an award that is proportionate to the
obligor’s income minus the preexisting child support order.149
Thus, the guidelines only result in an award that is in the best
interest of the first family.
145. See Amanda Kowal & Laurie Kramer, Children’s Understanding of
Parental Differential Treatment, 68 CHILD DEV. 113, 117 (1997) (Studies
suggest that children equate fairness with exact equality regardless of the
purpose of the parent’s behavior. So, even though the law forces the parent to
pay less money to the subsequent family, the reason why the inequity occurs is
irrelevant to the child. He or she only recognizes that it is unequal treatment.).
146. Because children equate fairness with exact equality, a policy that
renders equal awards for both families will be the best at meeting this criterion.
Id.
147. See discussion supra Part III.B.
148. See discussion supra Part II.B (arguing that Legislature should not
consider keeping the first-family-first policy because it is fundamentally flawed
in that it violates the Equal Protection Clause).
149. See discussion supra Part I.B.

2012]

COMMENT

319

Finally, the obligor’s subsequent children could perceive the
award resulting from application of the first-family-first policy as
unfair because the prior children would receive more financial
support.150 Because the first-family-first policy meets none of the
three criteria, it is not the best policy for Louisiana.
2. Second Family First
The second-family-first policy is likewise not the best choice
for Louisiana because it also fails to meet any of the three criteria.
Though the calculation method used in second family first is the
opposite of the calculation used in first family first,151 the problems
with the two policies are identical. Like the first-family-first
policy, the second-family-first policy is unconstitutional because it
creates a birth order-based classification that is not substantially
related to an important government interest.152 Attempting to
prevent an obligor’s second family from financial turmoil may be
an important state interest;153 however, an obligor’s duty to support
his first family is equally important.154 Thus, classifying children
based on their birth order is not important enough to justify the
discriminatory classification. And even assuming that the
governmental interest is important, the classification is not
substantially related to that interest because previously born
children cannot do anything to ensure that their parent pays his or
her obligations to the second family.155
The second-family-first policy also fails to meet the best
interest of all the obligor’s children. The policy results in an award
that is in the best interest of the obligor’s subsequent family only
because the second family’s child support is awarded in proportion
to the obligor’s total income; whereas, the first family’s child
support award is not.156 Since the policy, as applied, does not result
in an amount that is consistent with the best interest of all the
150. See discussion supra Part I.B.
151. See discussion supra Part I.B.
152. The second-family-first policy creates a birth order-based classification
because child support is awarded based on whether the child comes from the
subsequent family or the prior family. See MORGAN, supra note 7, at § 3.04[b].
153. The State’s interest would be the financial success of the second family.
See Thompson, supra note 46, at 250. This interest, however, is not substantial
enough to create a discriminatory classification because children cannot control
whether their parents pay child support. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
154. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
155. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769 (1977). See also discussion supra
Part III.B.2.
156. See Nelc, supra note 142.
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obligor’s children, the second-family-first policy fails to meet this
criterion.
Finally, the obligor’s prior children would not perceive the
amount awarded via the second-family-first policy as fair. Children
equate fairness with equality; however, the second family first
policy results in awards that are unequal and would likely provoke
feelings of inferiority and jealousy among the obligor’s prior-born
children.157 Therefore, Louisiana should not adopt the secondfamily-first policy.
3. Subsequent Children as Defense to Upward Modification
A policy that treats subsequent children as a defense to upward
modification meets the criteria slightly better than first family first
and second family first. But it, too, is not the best choice for
Louisiana. In cases where the domiciliary parent from the obligor’s
prior relationship files suit to modify a preexisting child support
order and the non-domiciliary parent defends himself or herself
from this modification attempt by asserting that he or she supports
children from a subsequent family, this policy does not create a
discriminatory classification. Thus, in modification cases, the
subsequent-children-as-a-defense-to-upward-modification policy is
constitutional.158
On the other hand, in non-modification proceedings, the policy
is identical to first family first and is therefore unconstitutional.
Moreover, the support obtained by use of this policy is not in the
best interest of all the obligor’s children in non-modification
proceedings because the second family does not receive child
support awards that are proportionate to the obligor’s total
income.159 Finally, subsequent children would not perceive the
amount awarded under this policy as fair because the first family
inherently receives more child support.160 Such an inequality
would likely provoke feelings of inferiority amongst the obligor’s
subsequent family.161
157. See Kowal & Kramer, supra note 145.
158. A modification proceeding refers to one parent’s attempt either to
decrease or increase a preexisting child support order. See LA. CIV. CODE art.
142 (2011). Only the prior family involved in the modification proceeding can
have its support altered. The subsequent family must file a separate modification
proceeding to have its support raised. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 141 cmt. c (2011).
159. See discussion supra Part III.C.1.
160. See discussion supra Part III.C.1.
161. Children equate fairness with equality. See Kowal & Kramer, supra
note 145. Although the needs of subsequent children may be considered in a
modification proceeding, the subsequent children’s award will not be modified
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The only benefit of the subsequent-children-as-a-defense-toupward-modification policy over the first-family-first policy is that
the former is constitutional in modification proceedings. In nonmodification proceedings, however, this policy is identical to first
family first, and, consequently, it is not the best policy for
Louisiana.162
4. Subsequent Children as Cause for Downward Modification
An analysis of a policy considering subsequent children a
cause for downward modification is essentially identical to the
above analysis of a policy considering subsequent children as a
defense to an upward modification.163 Both policies are only
constitutional in modification proceedings. Neither renders awards
that are in the best interest of all the obligor’s children, nor do they
not render awards that are perceived as fair by the obligor’s
children.164 Despite these similarities, the subsequent-children-asa-cause-for-downward-modification policy is better than the
subsequent-children-as-a-defense-to-upward-modification policy
because the former can be used in both types of modification
proceedings. Thus, the subsequent-children-as-a-cause-for
downward-modification policy better facilitates constitutionality
since it can be used more often in modification proceedings.
Nonetheless, Louisiana should choose a policy that meets all of the
criteria in establishment and modification proceedings. Downward
modification, therefore, is not the best policy for Louisiana.
5. Equalization of Obligor’s Children
Equalization is the best policy for Louisiana because it is
constitutionally sound, it renders awards that are in the best interest
of all the obligor’s children, and it would be perceived as fair by
the obligor’s children. Unlike the first-family-first policy or the
aforementioned alternatives, the equalization policy does not create
a discriminatory classification because all of the obligor’s children

unless their parent files a modification action. LA. CIV. CODE art 142 cmt. c
(2011). Thus, children will not perceive the amount awarded as fair unless their
parent also files a modification proceeding.
162. See discussion supra Part III.C.1.
163. See discussion supra Part III.C.3.
164. See id. In proceedings to establish support, the policy is unconstitutional
because it creates a class that is not substantially related to any important
government interest. See discussion supra Part III.B.
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are treated equitably.165 Accordingly, the policy does not violate
the Equal Protection Clause and is therefore constitutional.166
Furthermore, application of the equalization policy results in
child support awards that are in the best interest of all the obligor’s
children. A policy in the best interest of all children should
establish each family’s child support award in proportion to the
obligor’s total income, and an equalization policy satisfies this
requirement. New Jersey is one state that uses an equalization
policy when calculating child support awards for multiple
families.167 New Jersey’s policy provides an excellent framework
for a potential Louisiana equalization policy; however, the
Louisiana Legislature should make certain adjustments when
adopting an equalization policy. Even though the equalization
policy used in New Jersey subtracts preexisting child support
orders from the obligor’s income,168 child support is awarded in
the best interest of the obligor’s children because the court “may
either average the orders or fashion some other equitable resolution
to treat all supported children fairly under the guidelines.”169
Finally, equalization would best meet the perceived fairness
criterion. This is because children equate fairness with exact
equality, and the equalization policy comes the closest to rendering
equal awards.170 In sum, because the equalization policy meets the
three criteria, it presents the best choice for calculating child
support awards for multiple families in Louisiana.

165. See N.J. CT. R. 5:1–:8 app. IX-A. The rules indicate the following:
When the court adjudicates a case involving an obligor with multiple
family obligations, it may be necessary to review all past orders for that
individual. If the court has jurisdiction over all matters, it may either
average the orders or fashion some other equitable resolution to treat all
supported children fairly under the guidelines. If multiple orders reduce
the obligor’s income to an amount below the self-support reserve, the
orders should be adjusted to distribute the obligor’s available income
equitably among all children while taking into consideration both the
obligee’s share of the child support obligation and obligor’s selfsupport reserve.
Id.
166. See discussion supra III.B.1. As the policy does not create a
discriminatory classification, no equal protection analysis is necessary.
167. See N.J. CT. R. 5:1–:8 app. IX.
168. See id.
169. Id. See also 2004 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 52, at
29 (“[T]he best interests of all children are better served when special
consideration is taken to ensure fair distribution of limited resources.”).
170. See Kowal & Kramer, supra note 145.
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New Jersey’s equalization policy gives judges discretion when
calculating child support awards for multiple families.171 This
discretion, however, may prove problematic because, historically,
“leaving the determination of child support to the complete
discretion of judges . . . led to inconsistent orders.”172 A problem
with New Jersey’s policy, therefore, is that judges may have too
much discretion in setting child support.173 Accordingly, in the
implementation of an equalization policy, the Louisiana
Legislature should limit judicial discretion by restricting the
situations in which judges may fashion equitable solutions in
certain situations, such as when one family has special needs that
warrant more support.174 The Louisiana Legislature should either
171. See N.J. CT. R. 5:1–:8 app. IX-A (demonstrating how New Jersey uses
an equalization policy that equitably divides the obligor’s resources); Martinez
v. Martinez, 660 A.2d 13, 19–21 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1995). The Martinez
case provides an example of such equitable distribution of support. Because the
child from the first family was healthy, while the child from the second family
was an infant with medical difficulties, the judge in Martinez granted the second
family more money than the first family. The judge looked into the costs
associated with the infant’s illness. With these considerations in mind, the judge
found that justice required a reduction in the first family’s child support award:
“I recognize that any dollars taken from the first family children may pinch to
some degree. But I also find that unlike their half-brother, they do not have the
crisis of health, shelter and survival unknowingly faced by an infant now living
in a family on the economic brink.” Id. at 20.
172. MORGAN, supra note 7, at § 1.02 (“[T]wo noncustodial parents with the
same number of children, the same income, and the same circumstances, might
very well obtain vastly different support orders.”). Before the Family Support
Act of 1988, child support awards were inconsistent and inadequate. This
prompted the U.S. Congress to limit a state judge’s discretion in order for child
support awards to be more consistent.
173. If the Louisiana Legislature chooses to implement the equalization
policy, it will also face the issue of whether all existing child support orders for
multiple families should be reopened and equalized. In order to avoid onerous
administrative burdens, the Legislature should not force courts to retroactively
equalize child support orders for multiple families. Instead, the equalization
policy should be used in all proceedings to establish or modify support filed on
or after the day that the Legislature implements the equalization policy. See LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.1(A) (Supp. 2012). Louisiana Revised Statutes section
9:315.1(A) indicates that “[t]he guidelines set forth in this Part are to be used in
any proceeding to establish or modify child support filed on or after October 1,
1989.” Id. The Legislature could write something similar as a preface to the
equalization statute.
174. Currently, a child’s daycare costs, health insurance premium costs,
extraordinary medical expenses, and other extraordinary expenses are subtracted
from the child support obligation. These costs could also be used as mechanisms
to gauge whether the needs of one child are more compelling than another. Only
in those cases where one family’s needs are more compelling could the court
fashion an equitable solution. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.19, Worksheets
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give judges the ability to average the obligor’s child support orders
like New Jersey or structure the guidelines such that an obligor’s
child support orders are automatically averaged.175 In addition to
averaging support orders, Louisiana judges should have the option
to fashion an equitable solution when one family absolutely needs
more financial support.176
Based on this analysis of available alternatives, an equalization
policy that averages support orders and considers the unique needs
of one family only when necessary is the optimal solution for
Louisiana’s multiple family quandaries. Because Louisiana is
required to abide by the federal Constitution,177 the Legislature
must purge the unconstitutional first-family-first policy from the
guidelines and should exchange it with an equalization policy. Not
only would such a policy be constitutional, but the policy’s
application would also render awards that are in the best interest of
all the obligor’s children and perceived as fair by all the obligor’s
children.
CONCLUSION
Although a plethora of alternative policies better protect all
children who receive child support,178 the Louisiana Legislature
has done nothing to eliminate first family first and thereby end the
discriminatory treatment of subsequent children. If the guidelines
are not changed, children from subsequent families will continue to
face discrimination for no important reason. Moreover, child
support awards will not be awarded in the best interest of an
obligor’s subsequent children, and subsequent children will
continue feeling inferior to their previously born siblings.179 The
State can no longer force parents to play favorites, and the
Legislature must immediately amend its unconstitutional child
support guidelines.
Taylor Gay∗

A & B (2008). Judges also have the option to subtract for the child’s income if
applicable. Id.
175. See N.J. CT. R. 5:1–:8 app. IX-A.
176. See id.
177. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
178. See discussion supra Part III.C.
179. See discussion supra Part III.C.1.
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